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Introduction   
 
“Assessing the South China Sea Arbitral Award after One Year: Why China Won and the 
U.S. is Losing”   
           12th July 2017, Lawfare 
 
“Photos show Beijing’s militarization of South China Sea in new detail” 
 
                6th February 2018, The Guardian  
 
“A Year Later, the South China Sea Award Stands as Evidence of China's Rule-Breaking 
Behavior” 
                         17th July 2017, The Diplomat 
 
 
Almost two years have elapsed since the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) gave its 
decision in case of The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China (The 
South China Sea Arbitration)1. The decision represented a major legal victory for the 
Philippines in the case they brought before the Tribunal three years earlier in order to curb 
China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea. The long-lasting maritime and territorial 
disputes between China and other regional claimants have caused recurring tensions in the 
sea, with China occupying features, undertaking construction activities and using its naval 
force, to uphold its claims of sovereignty. The Tribunal’s decision was expected to have a 
significant impact on the course of the disputes since it was ‘final and binding’. Many 
scholars and experts predicted a strong reaction of the Chinese, with possible escalation of 
the conflict due to Chinese persistence in upholding its claims. However, contrary to the 
expectations, storm clouds have dispersed and conflict has stayed out.  
 Although compliance with the ruling is mandatory, China rejected the decision of the 
PCA from the start. Acceptance of the decision would mean that China’s policy and behavior 
in the South China Sea would have to undergo major changes. Contradictorily, the country 
has continued its land reclamation activities, defends the disputed waters with its large naval 
and coastguard fleet and still illegally occupies features. Up to today, China has not brought 
its claims and activities into line with the decision or the UNCLOS Convention2. Also contrary 
to expectations, tensions concerning the non-compliance of China have largely stayed out. 
Tensions in the South China Sea seem to have decreased while China continues 
undisturbed with its ‘illegal’ activities in disputed waters. The disputes between several 
claimant states and China are ongoing and represent a dangerous situation with not only 
regional, but also global consequences if it were to escalate. This study therefore, 
                                               
1 See “Case view”, Permanent Court of Arbitration 
2 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
   5 Master Thesis: Padberg, Martijn (s2102145) 
 
5               China: Building the Great Wall of Sand  
investigates how it is possible that China, despite the PCA’s decision, has been able to 
maintain its dominance and activity in the South China Sea without escalating? 
 This study will examine the course of events and the circumstances of the case in 
order to explain the absence of any real conflict to date. Next to China, a special focus on a 
number of countries will be applied as the interactions between these countries and China 
have influenced China’s strategy and the factors for the subsequent ‘Chinese success’ in 
upholding its dominant and assertive position in the South China Sea. The Philippines and 
Vietnam have traditionally been the most vocal in defending their sovereignty claims and 
unilateral right to exploit natural resources that lie within their maritime zones. As the 
regional actors most involved in high-tensed disputes with China, understanding their affairs 
in the South China Sea is necessary. Additionally, the undeniable role of global superpower 
and Pacific actor the U.S. is being taken into account in order to explain where China’s 
ability to continue its behavior undisturbed stems from.  
 In order to clarify the current situation, the first few chapters will elaborate on the 
significance of the South China Sea to China, the course of the disputes and the case 
brought before the PCA respectively. The study will continue with an account of the 
Tribunal’s decision and the expected and actual events on the ground in the post-arbitrary 
period. After a detailed elaboration of the case, this research will make a three-tiered 
argument in order to answer the research question. Chapter 5 will turn to the geopolitical 
developments concerning the Philippines and the U.S. that have downplayed the 
significance of the decision and given China means to pursue its interests without 
compliance with the decision. Chapter 6 will continue by arguing for China’s utilization of 
hard and soft power to coerce and entice other actors to accept and even cooperate in its 
behavior in the South China Sea. After Chapter 7 has shed light on the role of effectiveness 
of international institutions in this case, an overview of the arguments made will be given in 
the concluding chapter. 
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Ch. 1. Significance of the South China Sea to China 
 
The South China Sea has taken an important position in Chinese contemporary regional 
policy and strategy. For this there are several reasons. First, Chinese military strategists 
view the sea as China’s ‘strategic backyard’, or as some Chinese analyst have called it, a 
‘strategic frontier’ (Swe et al. 2017:187). The features scattered across the sea can function 
as military bases and support locations for law enforcement (e.g. coastguard) that help the 
Chinese not only to defend territorial claims, but also to monitor and respond to activities of 
other countries present in the area (O’Rourke 2015:2). The sea is being perceived as vital to 
the national defense of China as it creates a strategic hinterland of over one thousand 
kilometers (Swe et al. 2017:206).  
Through artificial land reclamation and claiming existing features in the sea, China is 
supposedly creating what concerned neighbor states have called ‘The Great Wall of Sand’3. 
This defensive line is believed to be designed according to the idea of the Great Wall to keep 
out invasive forces: in this case keeping other claimants and third parties out of Chinese 
maritime territory in the South China Sea4. Long-term presence of China in the sea is 
increasingly assured by building airstrips, ship facilities and placing surveillance and weapon 
equipment on the newly build islands5. These means create the improved ability to detect 
and challenge activities of rival claimants and third parties in the area, such as the recurrent 
presence of the US Navy trying to assert freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (Paul 
2016:11). Winning effective control would not only create a way to becoming the regional 
hegemon, but also to taking a lead in the hegemonic power projection competition between 
China and the US in the region (Koo 2017:53). 
Secondly, the South China Sea has a large economic significance not only for China, 
but for the global economic realm as a whole. The sea is being dubbed a “superhighway of 
the seas” due to its huge importance as a trade and transport route for goods and raw 
materials (Paul 2016:5). Every year 5.3 trillion dollars’ worth of trade passes through the 
sea-lane, most of which traveling to or from China and other regional countries6. The Strait 
of Malacca, the entrance of the South China Sea, is the gateway for a third of the world’s 
available crude oil and half of the world’s liquefied natural gas making its way to recipient 
                                               
3 See “China’s ‘Great wall of Sand’ in the South China Sea: History Repeating Itself?” The National 
Interest, April 14th 2016. First use of this ironically meant name was by the Commander of the US 
Pacific Fleet Harry Harris, see Paul (2016). 
4 Described comparison made by Marie-Alice McLean-Dreyfus in “China’s ‘Great wall of Sand’ in the 
South China Sea: History Repeating Itself?” The National Interest, April 14th 2016. 
5 See “China has reclaimed 3,200 acres in the South China Sea, says Pentagon”, The Guardian, May 
13th 2016.   
6 See “By the Numbers” in “China’s Maritime Disputes: A CFR InfoGuide Presentation”’, Council of 
Foreign Relations. 
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countries in East Asia and beyond (ibid:7)7. Regional developments therefore would not only 
have an impact on coastal states of adjacent sea areas, but also on trading nations 
worldwide (ibid:5). Whoever controls the South China Sea, subsequently controls a decisive 
part of the global economy (Paul 2016:7). Safeguarding these sea-lanes, together being the 
gateway between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, therefore also aims to guarantee the 
continuation of the economic growth China is experiencing (O’Rourke 2015:2). China has 
already declared that it is no longer satisfied to entrust the U.S. with the security of the sea-
lanes in the South China Sea (Wong 2010:3). 
In addition to the significance created by trade affairs in the South China Sea, 
China’s quest for natural resources make this area of core interest to the Chinese economy 
(Economy & Levi 2014, Buszynski & Salzan 2007). Due to large deposits of offshore gas 
and oil found in the seabed, the sea has been labeled the “new Persian Gulf” (Paul 2016:7). 
Statistical reports from the US Energy Information Administration show estimations of 11 
billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of gas being present under the South China 
Sea8. The Chinese state oil company China National Offshore Oil Corporation has stated 
their estimations to be much higher, consisting of around 125 billion barrels of oil, possibly 
making it even more interesting for the economic future of China9. As the country is unable 
to meet its own demand for natural resources with domestic sources, the annual double-digit 
Chinese economic growth is driving an unprecedented demand for resources (Economy & 
Levi 2014: 2,6). China’s resource quest has subsequently increased chances of clashing 
with coastal neighbors due to overlapping claims on the oil and gas riches of the South and 
East China Sea (Park 1978:39). 
Not only the bottom and surface of the South China Sea contain value for China and 
the adjacent countries. The waters of the South China Sea and the sparse islands, islets, 
rocks and reefs found there yield as much as ten percent of the world’s catch of edible fish 
(Dutton 2011:47, Paul 2016:7). Next to the economic importance of the fishing industry, 
protein of fish is of essential importance for the nutrition of not only the exponentially growing 
population of China, but of all regional competitors10. China’s coastal waters used to provide 
rich fishing grounds, but those times have passed due to overfishing and deterioration of 
water quality and seabed life11. The conflict in the South China Sea has therefore also been 
                                               
7 Estimation lie at 15.2 million barrels a day (Paul 2016:7). 
8 Numbers from a 2013 US Energy Information Administration report found in Paul (2016:7). 
9 Estimation of CNOOC found in Paul (2016:7). 
10 Between 35 and 57 percent of all animal proteins consumed in Southeast Asian countries stem 
from the South China Sea fishing grounds. See “The South China Sea Is Really a Fishery Dispute”, 
The Diplomat, 20th July 2016. 
11 See “Restoring China’s coastal fisheries”, China Dialogue, 13th March 2018. 
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argued to be a ‘fishery dispute’, partly because the majority of direct confrontations between 
claimant countries concerned disagreement over the presence of fishing vessels12. 
Lastly, the sea has added value for the Chinese from a psychological perspective. As 
its land borders are more secure than at any time since the 18th century Qing dynasty, 
China is trying to psychologically erase two centuries of foreign domination by reclaiming 
what has been “Chinese territory since ancient times”13(Kaplan 2011: 78). Indicated by the 
so-called ‘nine-dash line’14 with which China delimits the maritime area it considers to be 
Chinese territory. The demarcation is based on historic rights arising from Chinese 
domination and control in the centuries before foreign transgression (Koo 2017, Kim 1998)15. 
The Chinese education system and propaganda subsequently teaches Chinese citizens that 
the sea has been under Chinese jurisdiction for centuries, only interrupted by European 
colonial powers and the Second World War. The Chinese narrative is describing historical 
and legal evidence for its entitlement and deems all claims of other countries unlawful (Swe 
et al 2017:205). Because this Chinese narrative appeals to the Chinese population, the 
general public feels a sense of entitlement to the sea and the islands (ibid:205). A larger part 
of the Chinese public even argue that the South China Sea should be regarded as ‘China’s 
sea’ (ibid:205). China’s economic and political growth in the past few decades has initiated 
increased Chinese confidence and nationalist rhetoric, subsequently leading to pressure on 
Chinese policy to continue its assertiveness over sovereignty claims in the South China Sea 
(Buszynski 2013: 7).  
Altogether, the South China Sea is a viable asset to China and other claimants due 
to its military, strategic, economic and ideological value. Its values have not only been 
weighted heavily by the Chinese, but by many other regional actors, consequently leading to 
many disputes and conflictual situations described in the overview in Chapter 2. 
 
                                               
12 See “The South China Sea Is Really a Fishery Dispute”, The Diplomat, 20th  July 2016. 
13 Pronunciations of Chinese president Xi Jinping. See Swe et al. (2017) p. 205. 
14 See figure 1. Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection - Asia maps. 
15 The ‘nine-dash line’, adopted by the Chinese in 1947 has never been recognized by the 
international community and has no meaning in international law (Bonnet 2012:22). 
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Fig. 1. Nine-dash line indicated by green lines 
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Ch. 2. The South China Sea Conflict: A Short Overview  
 
The contemporary territorial disputes in the South China Sea have their initial origins well 
over a century ago, dating back to when colonial powers moved into the area and took 
effective control of island groups formerly controlled by the Vietnamese and Chinese state. 
The Second World War saw Japan occupying most of the features found in the sea, 
resulting in a power struggle between regional claimants when the Japanese withdrew in 
1951. However, in order to understand the contemporary conflict, this study will focus mainly 
on the last several decades, supplemented by information about events further back in time 
when deemed necessary. In addition to this restriction, these chapters will focus mainly on 
the claims of China, The Philippines and Vietnam in order to answer the research question 
properly. In order to give readers a picture of the run-up to the Hague tribunal’s decision in 
2016, this chapter will give a short overview of the contemporary dispute and tensions  
 The South China Sea concerns a semi-enclosed sea, including 15 islands of the 
Paracel archipelago, 45 ‘islands’ and numerous reefs and rocks of the Spratly archipelago, 
the Macclesfield bank and three islands of the Pratas Group (Buszynski 2013:4). The 
dispute concerns the sovereignty over these islands and the surrounding waters that can be 
claimed as territorial sea according to the UNCLOS Convention16. In addition, claimants can 
obtain sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing 
the natural resources of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its 
subsoil: all within a 200-nautical mile zone measured from the baseline17.  
The disputes are between China and five ASEAN countries, namely the Philippines, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. China roughly claims over 80% of the South 
China Sea, delineated by the aforementioned ‘nine-dash line’, effectively claiming both main 
archipelago’s to be Chinese territory18. Vietnam as well has an extensive claim to the sea, 
claiming both archipelago's based on historical evidence, economic development, effective 
administration, and international recognition (Pedrozo 2014:37)19. The remaining countries 
claim contiguous sea zones based on the legal framework of the UNCLOS Convention20. 
The main problems arising are the non-statutory claims of both China and Vietnam, and the 
                                               
16 Claimants can claim a 12-nautical mile zone of territorial water from the baseline determined in 
accordance with the Convention. See “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”. 
17 This zone is called an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZs). See “United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea”. 
18 Legal notions for claiming territory and other zones in UNCLOS do not significantly benefit China, 
due to which the country has tried and validate its claims based on historical notions (Buszynski 
2013:4). 
19 See elaboration on the above mentioned arguments for Vietnam’s claim in Pedrozo (2014) Ch.IV: 
“Vietnam claims”, 37-64. 
20 See figure 2. Source: the Brookings Institution.  
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lack of clear guidelines in the UNCLOS Convention where claims to sea territory, islands and 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) overlap (Buszynski 2013:4). 
  
Fig. 2  Maritime Boundary Claims in the South China Sea 
 
In the disputes, China has attracted the most attention due to its expansive claims, past uses 
of force to ascertain its controls over disputed waters and islands, and its growing naval 
capabilities (Taylor Fravel 2011:292). Since the mid 1990’s, China is effectively trying to 
delay a resolution of the conflict in order to consolidate its sovereignty and maritime claims 
(ibid:293). In addition, China has tried to deter other claimants from strengthening their own 
claims, primarily through the use of diplomatic, administrative and military means 
(ibid:293)21. Being almost entirely excluded from the sea by U.S. naval presence during the 
Cold War, China was in need of physical presence in the region as a public demonstration of 
its claims (Buszynski 2013:6). Chinese forces had occupied the eastern islands of the 
Paracels since 1956 and ejected Vietnamese forces from the western Paracels after a naval 
clash in 1974 (ibid:6). Near the end of the Cold War China started air patrols over the 
Spratlys and launched its first large-scale naval patrol in the area in 1987. As a part of these 
                                               
21 Taylor Fravel (2011) states that China has stepped up its game of deterrence since the mid-2000’s. 
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patrols, observation installations were built on multiple features in the sea and several 
islands were occupied. As a result of these moves, a naval clash between China and 
Vietnam occurred in 1988, sinking three Vietnamese vessels and resulting in 73 sailors lost 
(ibid:7). More recent tensions have arisen between China and Vietnam over exploration and 
exploitation activities of natural resources in the overlapping claimed areas, including the 
cutting of ship lines and deployment of deep sea drilling rigs with accompanied marine 
protection on both sides22. 
 The Philippines were also directly confronted with the presence of Chinese forces in 
parts of the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines. Chinese forces occupied Mischief 
Reef in 1995 and built several structures with piers and antennae, declaring the structures 
were intended as shelter for fishermen (Buszynski 2013:7). Due to the fact that China 
extended its constructions on this reef and others, it became clear that other intentions, more 
in particular, strategic protection of the features were underlying (ibid:7). These late-detected 
activities spawned uproar in the Philippines, which subsequently involved the U.S. in the 
incident as support, something which the Chinese had tried to avoid (ibid:7). During that 
same period tensions between the countries grew over the Scarborough Shoal, resulting 
even in a tense standoff between the countries’ respective naval forces in 201223. Until this 
day, naval patrols are being conducted by both countries to effectively enforce claims on the 
features near the coast of the Philippines.  
The occupying activities, military expansions and increased naval presence of China, 
leading to tensions in the South China Sea, have concerned not only Vietnam and the 
Philippines, but also other ASEAN countries as well as the U.S. (Swe et al.2017:210). Until 
2015, every annual defense budget of China showed a double-digit percent increase in 
military expenditure, going from 10 billion annually in 1997 to 145 billion in 201524. According 
to some analysts China is increasingly using its military expansion to deploy tactics of 
assertion and harassment to intimidate other claimants and deter them from further efforts to 
confirm or validate their claims (Buszynski 2013:7). As a result, China has been accused of 
applying tactics of ‘creeping annexation’, or ‘talk and take’, whereby China is engaging in 
negotiations while simultaneously taking action to gain control of the contested area by 
‘wrapping the islands in layers of occupation and protection’ (O’Rourke 2015:23). The U.S. 
and eleven other countries expressed their concerns about China’s claims and actions at the 
ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010. Some have argued that China -as a response to the 
regional blowback- began to moderate its efforts and prevent any further escalation of 
                                               
22 See Pedrozo (2014), Ch.III.A.2 “Economic Development” for elaboration on tensions between 
China and Vietnam over economic activities in the contested areas. 
23 See Bonnet (2012) for elaboration on the Scarborough Shoal incident.  
24 Data from Bitzinger (2015): China’s Double-Digit Defense Growth.  
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tensions (Taylor Fravel 2011:310). This resulted in a China-ASEAN agreement which was 
meant to prevent further escalations, mainly between the claimant states China and 
Vietnam25. While the agreement stated the desires and guidelines for accelerated bilateral 
negotiations over maritime issues, credibility was contested and Chinese occupation and 
construction continued unabated (Taylor Fravel 2011:310). 
 The assertive diplomacy of China has been argued to have created incentive for the 
U.S. to increase its presence and influence the course of events in Asia (Koo 2017:56). 
Increased U.S. military engagement in the area has involved the resumption of Freedom of 
Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea, the lifting of the arms sale ban on 
Vietnam, deployment of combat ships to Singapore (important economic and diplomatic 
partner of China) and the possible re-opening of air and naval bases in the Philippines 
(ibid:56). The Obama administration initiated a ‘pivot to Asia’, including summits with ASEAN 
members states to signal ASEAN support of U.S. efforts to contain China and prevent further 
provocations (ibid:56). Under the Trump administration FONOPs have only recently resumed 
after an interruption of several months during the beginning of his term of office; recently 
Trump declared the U.S. wants Australia to participate in operations in the South China 
Sea26. 
 Dispute resolution between China and other claimant countries was given a new 
impulse when the Philippines submitted, against Chinese requests, a unilateral application 
under UNCLOS regulations on dispute resolution on January 22nd, 2013 (French 2017: 49). 
The dispute settlement process allows one side of a dispute to initiate proceedings before 
several dispute settlement institutions, even when the other party remains absent (ibid:49). 
Although China to this day has rejected any form of legitimacy and participation, the arbitral 
tribunal under Annex VII UNCLOS, seated in The Hague, came with a decision in favor of 
the Philippines on July 12th 201627. In order to understand the significance of this decision, 
the next chapter will elaborate on the content of the case submitted with the Tribunal, and 
that of the subsequent decision.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
25 See Taylor Fravel (2011) p. 310-313 for elaboration on the management of escalation between 
Vietnam and China. 
26 See “Trump Would “Love” Australia to Join Freedom of Navigation Operations”, The Maritime 
Executive, 24th February 2018. 
27 For an extensive overview of the Tribunal’s decision see French (2017) 
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Ch. 3. The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s       
Republic of China) 
 
Case No. 2013-19 was submitted by the Philippines on the 22nd of January 2013. In total it 
consisted of 15 different claims concerning the South China Sea maritime disputes and 
Chinese behavior in these disputes. Since there was no prior consensus between the 
countries on dispute settlement, proceedings were held before an arbitral tribunal in absence 
of Chinese representatives (French 2016:49). As an impartial institution, the Tribunal of 
course had to, irrespective of absence, also consider the possibly legitimate interests of the 
Chinese. This was realized through the Chinese submission of several notes verbale which 
made its position on the case and the hearing clear to the Tribunal (ibid:49). It is important to 
understand the content of the submitted case and the subsequent Tribunal’s decision to 
determine the consequences for the course of the conflict. 
 
3.1: Content of Case No. 2013-19 
The case submitted with the Tribunal consisted of three main areas of claims. First, the 
Philippines asked for all South China Sea features to be determined according to the legal 
prescriptions given in the UNCLOS Convention (French 2016:49). Through this decision not 
only islands would be determined, but distinctions between low-tide elevations and rocks 
would also be made28. (ibid:49) These distinctions are very important as these different 
categories lead to different claims of maritime zones. Whereas an island comes with a claim 
of territorial sea (12 nm), an EEZ (200nm) and possible extensions along the continental 
shelves29, the other two categories give less rights to possible maritime claims. Rocks can 
(only) generate a territorial sea, while low-tide elevations give no right to any form of 
maritime zone. The decision could therefore make Chinese exploration, exploitation, fishing 
and coast guarding activities around a multitude of features illegal. As the tribunal has no 
right to address the question to whom specifically territorial sovereignty over the features 
belong, the Philippines tried to avoid insurmountable jurisdictional issues over territory 
(Whormersley 2016:242). This was accomplished by avoiding direct questions over territorial 
sovereignty or delimitation of maritime boundaries (French 2016:49). 
Secondly, the Philippines asked for arbitration concerning the historically-based ‘nine 
dash line’ used by the Chinese to outline its sovereign waters. As this demarcation is not 
based on legal prescriptions of the UNCLOS Convention, the Philippines asked for a 
                                               
28 Low-tide elevations are rocks which are visible during low tide but submerge during high-tide. 
29 Continental shelf extends beyond 200 nm and consists of seabed over which coastal states 
exercise sovereign rights regarding the exploration and exploitation of resources. See UN Oceans & 
Law of the Sea, “(CLCS) The Continental Shelf”. 
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denunciation of this claim, which would not only have value to the Philippines but also to the 
other claimants. Finally, to fight Chinese construction activities on islands within their ‘nine 
dash line’, which allegedly causes severe environmental harm and infringes Philippine 
sovereign rights of its EEZ, judgement over Chinese activities was asked (French 2016:49). 
The Philippines argued that China aggravated the disputes by land reclamation activities and 
restricting movement of Philippine (and other) vessels (ibid:50). 
 
3.2: The Tribunal’s Award 
Concerning the distinction between categories of features, the Tribunal had to take certain 
(legal) principles into account. Reclamation and artificial construction would in any event not 
change the nature of the feature (Whormersley 2016:243). This consideration is important as 
China is heavily involved in sand spraying and concrete laying on many of the disputed 
features. Additionally, the Tribunal had to decide on the determination of low and high tides 
in the area. Lastly, the Tribunal made a distinction between rocks and islands based on the 
question of whether human life is possible on the feature.  Subsequently, the possibility of 
human life was based on the livability and economic sustainability of the island (French 
2016:52)30. After taking all these questions and subsequent outcomes into account, the 
Tribunal decided that none of the disputed features in this case meet the criteria to be an 
island as defined in the Convention (Storey 2016:337). In addition to this decision, it made 
several distinctions between rocks and low-tide elevations which were in favor of the 
Philippines. Through these distinctions, Chinese sovereignty claims over several features 
near the Philippine coast became reprehensible: the Tribunal found that China had no legal 
entitlements and that there were no overlapping EEZ claims between China and other 
claimant states (Rosen 2017:259, Zhang 2017:441).  
Concerning the ‘nine dash line’, the Tribunal decided against the legality of this 
historically substantiated delineation. In short, the Tribunal decided in favor of the Philippines 
concerning this claim for two reasons. First, the Tribunal argued that UNCLOS provided a 
comprehensive system of maritime zones that is “capable of encompassing any area of sea 
or seabed”31. Through this, the Tribunal argued that, just as any sea, UNCLOS applied to the 
South China Sea and that parties to the Convention therefore should abide by the rules 
agreed to. Secondly, as China acceded to the Convention in 1996, the Tribunal argued that 
“any historic rights that China may have had to the living and non-living resources within the 
‘nine-dash line’ were superseded ... by the limits of the maritime zones provided for by the 
Convention”.32 The Tribunal thus argued that by officially becoming a party to this 
                                               
30 See French (2012), p.51-52 for further elaboration on provisions for distinction.  
31 See arbitration decision in “Award of 12 July 2016”, Paragraph 231. 
32 Ibid: Paragraph 231. 
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Convention through ratification, China has distanced itself from alternative claim 
substantiations.  
The Tribunal furthermore decided that China violated legitimate sovereignty-claims of 
the Philippines by entering and exploiting parts of the sea, coordinated escorting and 
protection of Chinese vessels in Philippine waters and did not take any measures to protect 
the environment harmed by its reclamation activities (French 2016:53). By continuing these 
activities during the arbitral proceedings, China was stated to have aggravated the dispute 
(Storey 2016:337). Against experts’ expectation, the court’s decision was far more 
comprehensive and decisive: The Philippines won 14 out of the initial 15 claims under 
consideration (Storey 2016:337). International observers have almost unanimously 
described the award to be an overwhelming victory for the Philippines, while the Chinese 
suffered a heavy defeat (Zhang 2017:440). 
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Ch. 4. Expectations & Aftermath of the Arbitration 
 
After the legal victory of the Philippines, expectations were that tensions over sovereignty 
and territorial claims would increase; with possibly even an actual escalation of the conflict 
between China and other claimant states. Despite the binding and final nature of the arbitral 
decision, the award did not resolve the litigation in a decisive manner (Whomersley 
2016:263). Although the decision has political and legal implications for all actors in the 
South China Sea disputes, it does not mean the dispute is over (Hong 2016:359). On the 
contrary, the decision was expected to possibly magnify the assertiveness of China and 
other coastal states over the disputed waters as they are still critical to the maritime security 
of all these actors (Liu & Karim 2017:4). The gap between expectations and actual 
materialization of the Tribunal’s aftermath will be assessed in this chapter.  
Analyzing the Tribunal’s decision and its subsequent consequences for regional 
tensions, one could argue that it has a two-fold outcome. On the one hand, the Tribunal’s 
decision significantly reduced the extent of disputed waters. Due to the made distinctions 
between rocks and islands, disputed waters were reduced to small pockets of territorial sea 
which actors could claim (Schofield 2016:344). By making the judgement that none of the 
high tide elevations in the Spratlys or Paracels can generate maritime entitlements to EEZ’s 
or continental shelfs, the Tribunal has freed most of the South China Sea from disputes (Anh 
2016:371). Therefore, it could be argued that tensions would disappear evenly with the 
waters no longer disputable. However, as a lot of these remaining pockets are occupied by 
the Chinese and lie within the EEZ of for example, the Philippines, direct confrontation was 
one of the predicted possibilities. According to Schofield, ruling that two sites of significant 
artificial island building by the Chinese, are part of the Philippines EEZ, made these feature 
possible future flashpoints (2016:346). As China will likely not suspend its reclamation 
activities, he argues that the decision could set the scene for increased maritime conflict in 
the South China Sea (Schofield 2016:346) 
It was expected that China would largely ignore the decision and, likely, escalate 
tensions in the South China Sea33. Analyst reacted to the verdict that China “may take a very 
tough reaction” or “a more forceful response to solidify its claims”34. Other argued that China 
would continue or even increase its blockades for Filipino soldiers stationed at several 
features and begin reclamation activities at new features ruled to be within the Philippines’ 
                                               
33 See “After the Tribunal’s Ruling on the South China Sea: A New Momentum for the Code of 
Conduct”, ASEAN Studies Program.  
34 Ibid. 
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EEZ35. It was expected that the decision would certainly not ease tensions between Manila 
and Beijing (Hong 2016:359). 
Although the Tribunal’s award is ”final and binding without appeal”, China and 
Taiwan rejected Tribunal’s decision (Schofield 2016:340). According to the Chinese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Tribunal’s award is “null and void” and contains “no binding force”36. 
Beijing repeatedly insisted on its ‘four no’s’: no participation, no acceptance, no recognition 
and no enforcement (Bautista 2018:184). The international community has repeatedly tried 
to convince China to abide by the decision of the Tribunal, especially the U.S. and Japan 
(Hong 2016:359). However, China has not signaled to be bringing its claims into line with the 
legal determinations found in UNCLOS (Storey 2016:338). Bautista even goes as far as to 
claim that the invisible forces of international law, global public opinion and “the waning 
power and clout of extra-regional powers such as the U.S.” have failed to force China into 
compliance with international law or prevent China from further militarization and occupation 
of features in the sea (2018:178). Chinese Prime Minister, Li Keqiang, argued against this 
and claimed that through China’s non-recognition and non-acceptance, international law was 
being safeguarded (Bautista 2018:184). This is because China has continuously stated its 
position on the missing legitimacy of the Philippines bringing the case before the Tribunal. It 
thus seems that China is trying to defend its reputation of “guardian of international rule of 
law”, while the country remains steadfast in its position concerning the sovereignty over the 
disputed features37. 
Initially, there were high expectations that the Philippines, after the legal victory, 
would call for other regional and outside parties to help enforce the decision, demand 
damage reparations for destroyed marine life, negotiate on fishing rights and conduct 
navigational operations (Bautista 2016:350). However, since the administration of President 
Duterte came into office (just before the Tribunal’s decision), successive measures and 
actions to limit Chinese assertiveness in the conflict have not come from the Philippines 
side, nor from other claimant states. Although China still claims and occupies, now illegally, 
features that lie within de maritime zones of the Philippines, tensions between the countries 
have lowered and the decision appears to have fallen sharply in value and significance as 
compliance is absent on both sides. The origins of this somewhat surprising course of 
events between China and the Philippines after the decision will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Contrary to the expectations, China did not increase its assertive behavior in 
response to the detrimental outcome of the arbitration proceedings; it merely continued its 
                                               
35 Ibid.  
36 See Statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China on the Award, 7th January 2016. 
37 Pronunciation of Chinese president Xi Jinping, see Bautista (2018:184). 
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activities (Storey 2016:338, Quintos 2018:266). The Chinese coastguard continued guarding 
the features and completed several naval, air, radar and defense facilities on the disputed 
reefs (Quintos 2018:266). Weapon systems are suspected to be installed on several 
features to increase point-defense capabilities and reports have argued that China is likely to 
start reclamation activities at the Scarborough Shoal, the feature closest to the Philippine 
shore (ibid:266). On the ground, China thus continued its activities undisturbed despite the 
decision that these features lie within the legitimate claim of the Philippines.  
In the diplomatic realm, however, China has been refraining from strong rhetoric over 
the disputes and applies a more diplomatic approach instead of the aggressive attitude it 
showed in previous discussions38. In official government documents, China continues to 
stress its sovereignty, maritime rights and interests. It warns other claimant states not to 
“internationalize and judicialize” their disputes with China39. Surprisingly however, China has 
stopped referring to the ‘nine-dash line’ and merely talks about indisputable sovereignty over 
certain features. As these Chinese warnings towards other claimants have not deterred the 
Philippines from bringing the case before the Tribunal, one could argue that other claimants 
would neither, especially not after the Tribunal’s favorable decision. Contradictory to the 
expectations however, no other claimant state launched their own legal challenge against 
China over disputed features and maritime zones (Bautista 2016:352). 
In order to prevent any future discussion or dialogue on the claims of other ASEAN 
countries, China has initiated a new cooperation mechanism for the South China Sea littoral 
states40. This mechanism would discuss non-traditional security issues in the South China 
Sea and would be China-led. A China-led mechanism where disputes in the South China 
Sea would be discussed and negotiated on, would most probably not result in fair and 
legitimate outcomes. Some scholars argue that China is applying tactics of “talk and take” 
where officials are involved in seemingly promising talks and negotiations while behind the 
scenes occupation and reclamation activities in the disputed waters continue (O’ Rourke 
2015:23). This behavior can be observed where the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
stated that it wanted to sustain the momentum of de-escalation of regional tensions and give 
rise to the cooperative spirit amongst claimant states, while at the same time its hard power 
dimension of policy -originating from the state’s military component- continues uninterrupted 
with installment of civilian and military facilities on the disputed features (Zhang 2017:454).  
Up to today, China has not altered its defiant posture and lack of respect for the 
Tribunal’s award (Bautista 2018:179). Although the Philippines were seen as the legal victor 
                                               
38 See “One Year after the PCA Tribunal Judgment on the South China Sea”, New York Times, 18th 
July 2017. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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after the Tribunal’s award, and major changes were expected in the course of the disputes, 
China can ironically be argued to be the winner of the arbitration (ibid:188). The country 
continues its activities in the disputed waters without much opposition of other claimants. 
The disputes have surprisingly not escalated into conflict. China has pursued certain 
strategic military and diplomatic tactics to ensure continuation of their undisturbed activities 
but has also profited from geopolitical developments and structural problems in international 
institutions. The following chapters will give a tripartite argument to show how China has 
been able to maintain its control over the disputed waters despite the negative outcome of 
the arbitration proceedings, with a special focus on the involved countries Vietnam, the U.S. 
and the Philippines. 
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Ch. 5. Geopolitical Developments 
In order to explain how China has been able to maintain its claims in the South China Sea 
despite the Tribunal’s decision, changing relations with -and involvement of- regional and 
extra-regional actors have to be considered. While this research focuses on the involved 
actors Vietnam, the Philippines and the U.S., this chapter merely contains arguments based 
on literature and other sources concerning the latter two. Extensive research has revealed 
that there is little to no literature on significant changes in Sino-Vietnamese relations 
following the Tribunal’s decision that have affected the course of the disputes. Therefore, 
this chapter elaborates on how changed Sino-Philippine relations, a lack of U.S. strategy and 
deteriorated relations between these two countries have contributed to China having the 
opportunity to uphold its claims and activities without escalating the conflict.  
  
5.1: Different President, Different China-policy  
The PCA’s decision was a legal victory for the Philippines and was expected to provoke a 
strong reaction from an assertive China. According to Kreuzer (2017) however, conflict has 
stayed out partly because of the change in the Philippines’ government days prior to the 
Tribunal’s decision. Two weeks prior to the decision, President Rodrigo Duterte came into 
office. Corazon Aquino, former president of the Philippines, changed the country’s foreign 
policy in response to Chinese encroachment of the Philippines’ EEZ (Santamaria 2018:324). 
She adopted a hardline policy towards China over the maritime disputes and engaged in 
close security ties with the U.S. and Japan (Bautista 2016:253). Duterte however started his 
term by doing the direct opposite. Bilateral negotiations between the countries were initiated 
in which Duterte declared that the Philippines, for the time being, might be willing to set the 
Tribunal’s decision aside, in order to improve the economic cooperation and diplomatic 
relations between the countries (ibid:253).  
According to Hermann, most drastic changes in a countries foreign policy occur when 
new governments with different perceptions of the environment and new agendas come to 
power (1990:4). These changes are important for external actors as they can have powerful 
consequences for other countries. The change in government in the Philippines, involving a 
president with radically different ideas than his predecessor, has significant consequences 
for the Chinese as rapprochement started as soon as Duterte took office. This sharp turn in 
policy towards China however, is not unfamiliar in Filipino political history. 
According to Yin, the condition of Sino-Philippine relations is dependent on the 
current relationship with the U.S. and on what alliances are perceived to be in the 
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Philippines’ contemporary interests41. In the past, the Philippines distanced themselves from 
Beijing when it perceived Taiwan as more valuable, turned to the U.S. when it felt threatened 
by China and later warmed its relations with China again when feeling the pressure of U.S. 
interests42. This diplomatic capriciousness has caused a periodic swing in Sino-Philippine 
relations which again saw a drastic turn when Duterte became president. Whereas China 
prior to the Tribunal’s decision had to deal with a pro-American and anti-China president in 
the Philippines, the situation now seems completely turned with Sino-Philippine relations 
having intensified under president Duterte. This has, according to Santamaria been a 
continuous pattern in maritime tensions between China and the Philippines since 1970 as 
“tensions have ebbed and flowed with the tide of successive Philippine administrations” 
(2018:325). 
Political leaders in the Philippines have been argued to have carefully calibrated 
actions right after the decision in order to cushion the blow for China’s legal defeat (Bautista 
2018:183). Right after the decision, Foreign Affairs Secretary Yasay of the Philippines issued 
an official statement in which he asked for “restraint and sobriety” (Bautista 2018:183). 
Although Duterte faces domestic criticism for being too soft against China over the long-
running territorial disputes, Duterte stated that he sees his approach to the case as 
pragmatic43. Duterte made it also clear that challenging China might trigger war between the 
countries, which would needless to say be devastating for the Philippines. Duterte has 
subsequently put the ruling “on the back burner” and will, as officials emphasize, revisit the 
decision later in his term, something which remains to be seen as half of his term has 
already passed44. Against initial expectations, neither China nor the Philippines therefore 
further heated the debate over the ‘islands’ and, instead of conflict, Sino-Philippine relations 
entered a period of intensification and tensions lowered45. 
One of the reasons the Philippines are shelving the arbitration’s decision is that 
Duterte wants to resume joint development with China in exchange for investments and 
technical expertise for extracting hydrocarbons from the South China Sea (Santamaria 2018: 
323). According to Santamaria, Duterte sees less in making China comply with the 
arbitration since it –in his view- accomplishes relatively little for the ordinary Filipinos 
(2018:325). Santamaria continues by stating that Duterte therefore cares more about 
receiving financial investments from China, securing the revenues from oil and gas royalties 
and hereby curbing its dependency on imported oil and enhancing the country’s long-term 
                                               
41 See “Vacillations and Dramas Exist in Sino-Philippines Relations Too”, Asia Pacific Bulletin, 11th 
January 2017. 
42 Ibid. 
43 See “China hails ‘golden period’ in relations with Philippines”, Reuters, June 29th  2017. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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energy security (2018:325). The fact that Duterte pays more attention to economic progress 
than upholding national sovereignty in its coastal waters, gives China more room to keep its 
claims on features in the Philippines’ EEZ undisturbed.  
Against the argument that Duterte is seeking rapprochement with China because of 
economic incentives, stands a security related argument. According to Walt (1987), there are 
two common approaches for states to deal with an external threat: balancing and 
bandwagoning. Through balancing, states can increase their security by forging alliances 
with other states against the prevailing threat (Quintos 2018:262). Contradictory, 
bandwagoning entails that states align themselves with the external threat in order to ensure 
their own safety (ibid:262). As China is a clear external threat to the Philippines because of 
proximity and Chinese assertive attitude in recent years, the Philippines are forced to react. 
While his predecessor clearly chose alignment with the U.S. as a counterbalancing means 
against the Chinese, Duterte is strengthening its links with China (Santamaria 2018:326). His 
strong anti-America rhetoric and colorful language towards the Chinese government over 
economic and security cooperation speaks for a radical turnaround in alliances, something 
which serve the Chinese very well in strengthening their grip on the South China Sea. As the 
Philippines are looking for security by bandwagoning with China, they become forced to 
accept the status quo of China occupying territory of the Philippines.  
Contrary to this argument of the Philippines enhancing economic and security 
relations in order to benefit from them, some argue that China is purposely promising 
investments and aid in order to create a dependency relation in which the Philippines will 
become trapped in debt (Shields 2018:18). Through “debt-trap diplomacy” China is argued to 
be giving the Philippines loans and investments until the country is unable to repay, finding 
themselves forced to give China access to their natural resources and strategic assets 
(ibid:18). By investing and granting loans China is argued to be creating dependency and 
debt which provides China with a means of putting pressure on countries such as the 
Philippines. 
When combining the above made arguments, we can state that one of the factors 
involved in the cooling down of the conflict comes from Duterte’s radical change of the 
Philippines’ foreign policy. The fact that this governmental change happened shortly before 
the Tribunal’s decision -and resulted in shelving of the verdict- has given China a huge 
advantage in controlling its disputes in the South China Sea. 
 
5.2: Lack of U.S. Strategy 
While China is engaged in territorial disputes with regional actors, external forces also play a 
role in the course of the region’s tensions. As the U.S. -being not only a global superpower 
but also a Pacific actor- has stakes in the course of the disputes, its presence and 
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involvement is clear. However, according to Brands & Cooper, U.S. strategy in the South 
China Sea has remained not only indistinct, but also ineffective (2018:17). The Obama 
administration repeatedly warned China to halt reclamation, construction and militarization in 
the South China Sea, but failed to halt, or even slow down, China’s activities. He argues that 
one reasons for this was the lack of credible U.S. pledges to military respond to Chinese 
aggression in the South China Sea, for example when looking at the Mutual Defense Treaty 
between the U.S. and the Philippines (Brands & Cooper 2018:17). U.S. leaders refused to 
comment publicly that it would intervene if the Philippines were to be attacked by China, 
something which the agreement suggests (ibid:17). 
 U.S. President Donald Trump, who became president early in 2017, holds widely 
different views than his predecessor, which influences his Asia policy.  As Trump is pushing 
an America First agenda, it has been questioned if Trump will continue the ‘pivot to Asia’ set 
up under the Obama administration. According to some, the U.S. has been an almost 
invisible presence since Trump took office, leaving a great-power vacuum in the region that 
China has been happy to fill46. President Obama supported adherence to international law in 
maritime security, despite the fact that the U.S. itself has not yet ratified UNCLOS (Dalpino 
2017:6). According to Dalpino, Trump, however, appears less interested in upholding this 
categorical imperative (2017:6). Brands & Cooper state that Trump’s administration as well 
is displaying struggles with outlining a clear strategy towards China and the South China 
Sea disputes (2018:17). While initially taking a hard stance on the issue, Trump soon 
receded from this policy by putting its focus on bilateral trade with China and the issue of 
North-Korea (Brands & Cooper 2018:17). Without a clear strategy towards China and the 
South China Sea, China is given room to continue its activities without threat of actual U.S. 
interference. 
The U.S., under Trump’s administration, have continued to exercise ‘freedom of 
navigation’ by doing routine controls in the waters claimed by China, and subsequently 
making public reports on these missions. U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated 
that the U.S. would carry out exercises in international waters and transit international waters 
as appropriate, as “freedom of navigation is absolute, whether it be commercial shipping or 
the U.S. Navy” (Quintos 2018:269) However, the amount of Freedom Of Navigation 
Operations (FONOPs) have been limited. For example, during the first half of 2017 not a 
single FONOP was conducted47. Brands & Cooper argue that although the U.S. under 
Trump has conducted FONOPs later in 2017, it lacks an overall strategy for addressing 
                                               
46 See “One year after the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Decision on the South China Sea”, Prif 
Blog, 12th July 2017. 
47 See “Is Donald Trump abandoning America’s ‘Asia pivot’?” 23rd August 2017. 
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China’s naval advances (2018:18). Without a clear strategy, U.S. capabilities to contain 
China in its activities in the South China Sea are limited. 
One of the challenges for the U.S. confronting China’s aggressive power, particularly 
in the South China Sea, lies with the fact that there are continues changes in the Trump 
staff. Steve Bannon, Trump’s former Chief Strategist and Senior Counselor, was willing to 
confront China, and raised the possibility of a renewed and reinvigorated “pivot to Asia”48. 
With Bannon fired and gone, the globalist who are left are likely to prefer a more cooperative 
and “integrationist’ approach toward Beijing49. Another of Trump's actions that endangers its 
relations with Asian countries and increases the likeliness of them siding with China, lies with 
his denunciation of participation in the TPP-agreement50. By stepping out of the agreement, 
the U.S. is losing credibility in multilateral agreements and will push countries in the region to 
look for economic cooperation with China’s successful economic statecraft51. Through this 
China’s influence will grow and U.S. regional importance will decline, giving way for China to 
possibly become the regional hegemon and subsequently upholding its claims without much 
opposition. 
Koo states that America’s reluctance to challenge China’s growing assertiveness has 
been interpreted as an acknowledgement of China’s legitimate interests in the South China 
Sea, giving China more space to continue or even expand its reclamation and occupying 
activities (2017:56). A lack of clear U.S. strategy and any concrete action to stop China from 
engaging in its ‘illegal’ activities has therefore contributed to the absence of escalation of the 
conflict, despite China’s persistence in the South China Sea. 
 
 
5.3: An alliance falling apart 
Not only increased bilateral relations between the Philippines and China affect the 
effectiveness of the tribunal’s decision, the deteriorating relationship between the Philippines 
and the U.S. does as well.  American-Philippine relations have taken a sharp turn as Duterte 
is opposed to what he sees as long-term American interference in Filipino foreign policy 
(2018:326). Influenced by a lack of confidence in the U.S. defense shield, Duterte argues 
that the country is safer by appeasing to China and in this way avoiding war (ibid:326). 
During a state-visit to China, Duterte announced the country’s military and economic 
“separation” from the U.S. (Bautista 2016:351). With this statement Duterte did not mean 
actually cutting ties with the U.S., but merely the beginning of a process of becoming 
                                               
48 See “Is Donald Trump abandoning America’s ‘Asia pivot’?” 23rd August 2017. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Trans Pacific Partnership (trade-) agreement. 
51 See “One year after the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Decision on the South China Sea”, Prif 
Blog, 12th July 2017. 
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independent from the U.S. in establishing and implementing of foreign policy (ibid:352) The 
U.S.-Philippine relations have cooled down since Duterte became president, as he spent the 
first months in office heavily rallying against U.S. criticism on the bloodiness of the war on 
drugs in the Philippines52. Furthermore, Trump’s insistence that all allies should pay equal 
and fair shares for U.S. protection will only further deteriorate the relationship between the 
countries, since Duterte already wants American troops out of his country53. Lastly, Trump's 
intentions with illegal immigration and economics have consequences for the U.S.-Philippine 
relations. Trump’s crack down on illegal immigrants may well have a large impact on the the 
Philippines’ economy. This is because remittances are send back by overseas workers, of 
which many reside in the U.S., collectively representing 10% of the Philippines’ GDP54. 
These difficulties between the U.S. and the Philippines could possibly be beneficial for 
China, since the country is instead stepping up its bilateral relations with China. The change 
of alliance can possibly give China an advantage in opposing the U.S. over maritime 
dominance in the South China Sea. 
According to Cruz de Castro, Duterte’s administration view China as an emerging 
power while the U.S. is a declining power in East Asia (2017:559). He continues by stating 
that this results in the Philippines’ policy of distancing itself from its treaty ally, the U.S., and 
seeking more rapprochement towards China (ibid:559). Although the Filipino government 
has stated that joint military exercises with the U.S. will continue, it stated that these 
activities will not take place in the South China Sea in order to prevent provocation of the 
Chinese (Shields 2018:25). The deteriorating American-Philippine relations have given way 
for China to engage increasingly in bilateral negotiations with the Philippines while enjoying 
a decreasing influence of the U.S. in the territorial disputes. Together, a lack of clear U.S. 
strategy, change in Filipino government and the subsequent deteriorating U.S.-Philippine 
relations, have made it relatively easier for the Chinese to, despite the Tribunal’s clear 
decision, uphold its claims in the South China Sea without escalating the conflict. 
 
                                               
52 See “One year after the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Decision on the South China Sea”, Prif 
Blog, 12th July 2017. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid.  
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Ch. 6. Rising China’s Power 
 
It is evident that if we look at China, we can conclude it to be an emerging regional and 
global power. The country has the largest population in the world, the fastest growing 
economy, the largest army in the world, the largest middle class in the world, a permanent 
seat in the UN Security Council, a nuclear arsenal and so on (Callahan 2005:701). 
According to Shirk, many in the West initially believed China’s rise would be a peaceful rise 
(2017:21). In the years after adopting a market-oriented economic policy, the country 
opened itself up to foreign trade, improved its friendly relations with neighboring countries 
and even joined several international institutions (Shirk 2017:21). According to several 
scholars, the speedy recovery of the Chinese economy after the financial crisis of 2008 
induced a sense of triumph and empowerment that gave China the strength to express its 
interest abroad more aggressively (Shirk 2017:21). China’s economic growth has also been 
accompanied by an increase in its military power which, subsequently, resulted in growing 
tensions in the South and East China Sea (Robertson & Sin 2017:93). 
According to Elizabeth Economy, China has replaced it’s “hide brightness, cherish 
obscurity” mantra with a far more expansive and muscular foreign policy (2014:88). The 
Asian giant has grown more confident and nationalistic since its global economic rise 
(Buszynski 2013, Yahuda 2013). This, according to Buszynski, has the effect that China puts 
more efforts in the continuation of its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, even with 
powerful external powers like the U.S. involved (2013:7). These interests, e.g. its sovereignty 
claims in the South China Sea, are pursued and ensured by what this chapter argues to be 
China’s use of hard and soft power. 
  
6.1: China’s hard power 
As China has become a global economic power with a substantial military force, it does not 
seem surprising that it is able to use its power to pursue its interests, often at the costs of 
others. The grown economy and military have given China means of hard power. According 
to Wilson, hard power is the capacity to coerce other states into acting in ways which it 
would not have acted otherwise (2008:114). These hard power strategies focus on military 
actions, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions to enforce national interests (Wilson 
2008:114). When looking for cases of Chinese hard power in the South China Sea disputes, 
many examples are to be found. 
Buszynski states that China has been increasingly using its military capability to 
deploy tactics of assertion and harassment to intimidate other claimants (2013:7). Prior to 
the Tribunal’s case for example, overlapping maritime claims of China and Vietnam have 
resulted in multiple incidents with military confrontation. A few examples are the severing of 
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cables of a Vietnamese research ship by the Chinese, or the opening of nine militarily 
guarded oil blocks in Vietnam’s EEZ by a Chinese state oil company (Anh 2016: 370). In 
addition, China has frequently approached Vietnamese fishing vessels aggressively with 
subsequent detainment of Vietnamese fishermen (ibid:370). In the regard to the Philippines, 
the 2012 Scarborough Shoal military stand-off and the subsequent economic sanctions on 
the country55 prove as examples of China exerting its military and economic power locally in 
order to enforce its maritime claims. 
Right before and after the decision, China used its military capabilities to defy the 
arbitral decision and demonstrate its sovereignty claims (Zhang 2017: 448). In the week prior 
to the Tribunal’s decision, China conducted a major exercise near the Paracel islands using 
all three of its fleets. Zhang (2017) argues that the timing of this ‘routine’ exercise suggest 
that it was targeted at the release of the decision as its outcome was expected to not be in 
China’s favour. Right after the decision, China’s military started to conduct regular combat 
air patrols over the area in addition to new military exercises (Zhang 2017:448). According to 
Herbert, China has been applying strategies of “showing the flag”, where either the Chinese 
navy, coastguard or other maritime militias are conducting increased patrols or exercises in 
disputed waters (2018:307). With these routines, China is symbolically reinforcing its claims 
through shows of strength, continuingly being present in the area and deterring foreign 
vessels from access to the disputed waters (Herbert 2017:307). Although not having used its 
military capabilities to forcefully seize islands controlled by other states since a 1974 incident 
against Vietnamese forces over the Paracel islands, its growing military strength and 
presence deters other claimants from taking military actions to ensure their maritime claims 
(Koo 2017:62) 
 China has not only been increasing its hard power by expanding its military and naval 
forces, but also by building new facilities on features that help China to enforce its claims. 
Against the outcome of the verdict, China’s top naval commander Wu Shengli stated that 
China was determined to continue its construction activities since land reclamation activities 
were finalized and the ‘islands’ now awaited installation of facilities, including military 
hardware (Zhang 2017:448). Reports have shown that China indeed has continued its 
building activities on the disputed features (ibid:448). According to Koo, the building of naval 
bases, airstrips and other military facilities on the disputed features provide the Chinese with 
additional edge over other regional actors and external parties like the U.S. (2017:55). 
By continuing land reclamation activities and the installment of research and military 
facilities on features in the South China Sea, China is argued to be adopting a “salami-
slicing” strategy (Cheng-Chwee 2017:184). This holds that China is adopting a series of 
                                               
55 Post-standoff, China issued economic restrictions on bananas from the Philippines. See “China lifts 
import ban on Philippines bananas”, Philstar Golbal, 7th October 2016. 
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incremental and selective measures to change the situation on the ground (Ibid:184). By 
using military and non-military means, China is consolidating its claims, creating possibilities 
to extract the well-needed resources and increase its physical presence on the claimed 
features. The continuation of these activities come with Chinese caution to further provoke 
direct confrontation but are eventually meant to confirm effective control over the South 
China Sea (ibid:184). The creation of a defense line by the Chinese on the “Great Wall of 
Sand” enlarges China’s hard power capabilities in future conflictual situations in the region. 
However, as China has become economically and militarily stronger in the past few 
decades, it has been less and less inclined to actually use this force (Hayton 2017:149, 
Taylor Fravel 2008). It has more often used different forms of power exertion like economic 
coercion, diplomatic pressure and the (mere) threat of using force (Hayton 2017: 151).   
According to Mearsheimer (2014) and Yahuda (2013) China is, due to its 
overwhelming power relatively to neighboring countries, in a good position to use military 
threats to force other actors into accepting deals largely on China’s terms. China has -
although abstaining from actual action- repeatedly threatened to use force in order to deter 
another country from certain actions. An example comes from a surge in tensions between 
China and Vietnam in the summer of 2017 over oil drilling plans of the Vietnamese in the 
South China Sea. Vietnam granted a Spanish oil company, Repsol, the rights to perform 
drilling activities in the disputed waters56. China responded by directly informing the 
Vietnamese government that it would attack Vietnamese bases in the Spratlys if the drillings 
did not halt (Sutter & Huang 2018:54). Vietnam was forced to inform Repsol of this threat 
and asked the company to halt the activities and leave the area. The Philippines have, just 
like Vietnam, experienced threats of force by the Chinese. In response to a statement of 
Duterte’s determination to drill for oil in the South China Sea, China’s President Xi Jingping 
allegedly responded that China wants to continue the warm relationship between the 
countries, but that war would commence if the Philippines forced the issue57. China’s 
neighbors are well aware of China’s military supremacy, which clearly gives China the 
capability to deter other states through threats of the use of force.  
The continued military activities and coercive diplomacy of the Chinese show that the 
country is well aware of its superior power compared to other regional actors. Due to its 
military and naval expansion, the country has become capable of enforcing sovereignty over 
disputed features without much actual opposition by other claimant states or the U.S. 
According to Koo, states in the region consider China to have become the regional de facto 
co-hegemon with the U.S., which has come at the cost of their own territorial integrity 
                                               
56 See “Alarming Escalation in the South China Sea: China Threatens Force if Vietnam Continues Oil 
Exploration in Spratlys”, The Diplomat, 24th July 2017. 
57 Ibid. 
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(2017:55). China can therefore be argued to, despite the Tribunal’s decision have the power 
and the ability to force its claims upon other claimants through the use of hard power without 
escalating into actual conflict.  
 
6.2: China’s soft power  
In contrast to hard power, soft power evolves around the capacity to persuade other actors 
to do what one wants (Wilson 2008:114). Through persuasion and attraction states can 
convince other states to go along with its proposals, ideas and requests. China is believed to 
have spent billions of dollars to boost its international image in order to increase the 
country’s international attractiveness and ability to influence other countries and publics58. 
According to Asian scholars, China is trying to advance its national interests through 
development assistance, diplomacy and soft power59. Additionally, China is argued to be 
trying to create friends and partners through investments and becoming a trade partner60. 
One of China’s strategies to increase influence is by developing relations with 
countries based on finding mutual preferences and integrate these into ‘win-win’ agreements 
in the economic and financial domain (Goh 2016:47). This is being achieved through 
financial investments, foreign assistance, new trade agreements and infrastructure 
development (Goh 2016:47). By strengthening economic ties with its regional neighbors, 
China is seeking to change the perception of China as a threat and tries to increase the 
attractive economic power of China (Swe et al. 2017:189). Having intensive economic 
relationships and being perceived as an attractive economic actor -with whom countries 
would like to cooperate with and benefit from- subsequently grant China increased soft 
power usable in the South China Sea negotiations (ibid:189). 
China has shown efforts to create a better and less aggressive image of itself on the 
regional and international stage. It emphasized navigational freedom in the South China 
Sea, while it still experiences its own difficulties with American FONOPs (Koo 2017:62). It 
has even adopted the Guidelines for the Implementation of the 2002 Declaration of the 
Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), which entails a code of conduct when 
unplanned encounters occur in the South China Sea61. Through the DOC and initiation of a 
crisis hotline between foreign ministers, China and ASEAN want to manage the disputes 
better (Hong 2016:360). These agreements and practical actions signal that China is willing 
to resolve the disputes and other issues more peacefully through cooperation and 
negotiation (Koo 2017:62). Through these policies, China is trying to alter the image of China 
                                               
58 See “China’s Big Bet on Soft Power”, Council on Foreign Relations, 9th February 2018. 
59 Curtis S. Chin in “China Using 'Soft Power' to Assert Rights Over South China Sea”, VoaNews, 22nd 
July 2016. 
60 Ibid. 
61 See “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”, ASEAN. 
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as an aggressive and assertive regional actor. However, according to Hong, China is still a 
long way from being persuasive enough that it will not use coercion instead of peaceful 
means to pursue its national interest (2018:242). 
The country is not only boosting its image with ASEAN actors. As China is seeking to 
improve extra-regional cooperation through its “One Belt, One Road Initiative”, it was forced 
to adopt a less assertive attitude in order to prevent disruption of stable cooperation between 
the regional actors (Cheng-Chwee 2017:163). This initiative creates “regional connectivity 
through a vast network of railways, roads, pipelines, ports, and telecommunications 
infrastructure that will promote economic integration from China, through Asia, the Middle 
East, and Africa, to Europe and beyond”62. Through initiatives like this China is showing 
friendly gestures towards its South East Asian neighbors and the further international 
community. According to Koo, China appears to be aware that becoming the provider of 
regional public goods can enhance its own position as a regional hegemon and contributes 
to the achievement of its own interest (2017:62). Sutter & Huang state that China with these 
initiatives is trying to establish itself as “the anchor” of peace, stability and development in 
the Asia-Pacific region (2018:54). Whereas relations with the Philippines hit an all-time low 
during the arbitrational proceedings, China now seems to invest heavily into restoring a 
positive image with the Philippines through cooperative agreements and aid63. 
Next to an increase in warm relationships and bilateral cooperative agreements with 
the Philippines, China also pursued a rapprochement with Vietnam in order to work towards 
a resolution of the maritime disputes between the two. The countries have set up joint 
inspection activities in the disputed waters and have started several cooperative projects 
aiming at the development of the sea basin (Hong 2018: 230).  During a recent state visit of 
China’s President Xi Jingping to Vietnam, the countries signed 12 cooperation agreement on 
trade and security issues (including on the management of the maritime issues) (Sutter & 
Huang 2018:54). Cooperative behavior between the countries will have a significant impact 
on the reduction of tensions. For example, where the Chinese and Vietnamese coastguards 
before came across unexpectedly and sometimes aggressively, now the two countries have 
even held work meetings between the respective coast guards (Hong 2018: 231). Although 
China has brought its coastguard under military command, and Vietnam is trying to push 
through a law that provides its coastguard more power while simultaneously also seeking 
cooperation with external powers such as Japan and the U.S.64, partnership between these 
coastguards can possibly prevent future clashes. As the countries now cooperate in certain 
                                               
62 See “China’s Big Bet on Soft Power”, Council on Foreign Relations, 9th February 2018. 
63 See “Sino-Philippine ties to move forward with more progress: ambassador”, Xinhua, 10th June 
2018. 
64 See “Why Vietnam's New Coast Guard Law Matters”, The Diplomat, 14th April 2018. 
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problematic areas, China can be perceived as a more collaborative and non-hostile partner 
to Vietnam, but also to other regional actors.  
Another tactic used by China lies with what Goh terms ‘discursive persuasion’. This 
strategy involves the persuasion of actors to tag along discursive positions like normative 
attitudes towards sovereignty and non-interference (Goh 2016:47). According to Swe et al. 
Beijing is “keen to change the strategic landscape, security architecture, bilateral security 
ties, the norm and rules and even the trajectory of politico-economic developments to 
China’s favor” (2017:188). By providing evidence that China’s beliefs are more accurate and 
desirable, it tries to propagate dominant beliefs which, once accepted, “constrain and align 
the preferences of the subject with those of the powerful actor”,  in this case China (Goh 
2016:13). By aligning ideas,  China can influence the role of international institutions, 
including those concerning dispute resolution. However, China’s efforts to influence the 
formation of new international institutions and its efforts to reshape existing institutions, like 
ASEAN,  have been limited (Goh 2016:47). One of the problems for this limited influence is 
that the power of the Western discourse is still much more influential in Asia and therefore 
makes it harder for countries to switch and follow China instead (ibid:47). One of the reasons 
for this lies with the admittance of other rising powers like Australia and India in regional 
institutions, but also the increased U.S. commitment to these institutions in recent years, 
effectively neutralizing the effects of China's growing power (ibid:47).  
 Despite the fact that its occupations and activities in the South China Sea continue, 
this chapter has argued that China was able to prevent the disputes from escalating through 
the use of hard and soft power. The country has used its military predominance to coerce 
other regional actors into acceptance of Chinese occupation and activities, and deterred 
them from taking practical measures. On the other hand, China has engaged in friendly 
negotiations, bilateral agreements and reputational recoveries in order to win the 
international community over and exert influence, which can be used in resolving the 
disputes in its favor. This mixed use of hard and soft power therefore confirms the theory 
mentioned before that China applies a strategy of “talk and take” whereby it engages in 
promising talks, agreements and action while simultaneously taking what it claims to be hers 
through the use of its military might.  
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Ch. 7. International Institutions and Dispute Settlement 
 
China has, despite the decision, not brought its claims in accordance with the regulations set 
out in UNCLOS (Storey 2016:338). The country has, again contesting the decision of the 
PCA, continued to emphasize its claims and has not shown any sign of retreat from the 
‘illegally’ occupied features within the Philippines’ EEZ (Storey 2016, Quintos 2018). Except 
for the somewhat silent disappearance of the ‘nine dash line’ in Chinese statements, 
Chinese compliance with the decision of this international arbitration institutions is absent. In 
order to answer the question how China, despite the negative decision of the PCA, has 
managed to sustain its dominant position in the South China Sea without escalating 
tensions, we must take a closer look at the international institutions involved. The PCA and 
UNCLOS are both very important international institutions involved in this case. The role of 
these institutions in the international arena and their involvement in -and subsequent effects 
on- the developments in the South China Sea are significant for explaining how China has 
downplayed the decision’s importance and evaded compliance. In addition to a more in-
depth examination of the role of these international institutions, it is also important to 
understand what effectiveness these institutions have in resolving disputes where states’ 
interests clash. 
On the effectiveness of international institutions in promoting peace and stability has 
long been debated. Realists and institutionalists have stood against each other when 
discussing whether institutions markedly affect the prospects of international stability 
(Mearsheimer 1994:7). While institutionalist claim this to be the case, realists deny such an 
influence. Realist state that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power 
in the world (Mearsheimer 1994:7). According to Mearsheimer, these institutions are based 
on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and do not possess the power to 
independently affect state’s behavior (1994:7). This last point is of significance in the case of 
the South China Sea, because as we observe post-arbitrational events we can clearly see 
that China, and even the Philippines, are not effectively influenced in their behavior by the 
PCA’S decision. The verdict spoke largely against China and if actually complied with, would 
have caused the withdrawal of Chinese claims, cessation of Chinese ‘illegal’ activities and 
adherence to the UNCLOS Convention in other existing disputes. China, however, has 
largely ignored and undermined the Tribunal’s decision by not complying with the award, 
continuing reclamation and occupying activities and by looking for ways to resolve the 
disputes outside the international institutions. Why and how exactly China was able to, more 
or less, surpass an international institution in which it takes part, has several reasons which 
will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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7.1: Chinese declaration of exception from dispute settlement  
First of all, one of China’s earliest arguments for dismissing the Tribunal’s decision stems 
from the exceptions filed at the time of ratification of the Convention. According to the 
Convention, states are allowed to make declarations or statements regarding the application 
at the time of signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention65. Although this does not 
exclude or modify the legal effect of the provisions of the Convention, it expresses a 
country’s position regarding the Convention, or certain parts of it. China ratified the 
Convention in 1996 at which time it also issued a declaration reaffirming its sovereignty over 
all its archipelago’s and islands and provided an additional declaration ten years later. On 
the 25th of August 1996, China issued a declaration in which it stated that it would “not 
accept any of the procedures provided in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with 
respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c)”66. The 
procedures mentioned entail any international judicial or arbitral jurisdiction with respect to 
disputes related to maritime boundary delimitation, territorial disputes or military activities 
(Mincai 2014:2). This reservation essentially excluded China’s participation in future 
arbitration(s) and in this way hampered the process of proper settlement through the 
institutions mechanisms. When the Philippines submitted the case in 2013, China declared, 
according to expectations, that it would not cooperate in the case brought before the 
Tribunal.  Although China claimed to exclude itself from compulsory arbitration, this claim 
cannot absolve its obligation to accept the results of the mandatory dispute resolution 
process (Zhao 2018:8). Therefore, a look at China’s contemporary arguments for rejection of 
the Tribunal’s decision should complement the argument that China’s non-participation 
hampers the functioning of the arbitration proceedings. 
  
7.2: Jurisdiction, admissibility & significance of PCA 
Therefore, as a second contributing factor to the circumvention of the Tribunal’s judgement, 
China’s arguments for delegitimization of the case have to be taken into account. After the 
Philippines submitted the case, China issued a declaration in which it stated not to accept 
nor participate in the arbitration based on the argument that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction 
over this case67. It stated that as the Tribunal arose from UNCLOS, questions about the 
sovereignty of the disputed features were beyond its jurisdiction (Schofield 2016:340). Next 
to delegitimizing the case on the basis of jurisdiction, China also spoke against the 
admissibility of the case. The declaration clearly states that the Philippines had no right 
                                               
65 See “Declarations and Statements” of the United Nations Oceans & Law of the Sea. 
66 See “Declaration China (25th August 2006)” under article 298 of UNCLOS. 
67 See China, “Position Paper on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated 
by the Republic of the Philippines”, 7th December 2014. 
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bringing the dispute before this institution on the basis that both countries agreed, through 
bilateral agreements and the DOC-declaration, to resolve the disputes through bilateral 
negotiations68. With this statement China accused the Philippines of violating its obligation 
under international law, and thereby seeks to undermine the legality and significance of the 
case, and the Tribunal. Beijing even launched a diplomatic campaign after the decision to 
convince governments around the world that the Tribunal was illegal and lacked jurisdiction 
(Zhao 2018:7). By increasing international support for the delegitimization of the case, 
effectiveness of the decision becomes impaired.  
China has not only clearly expressed strong opposition towards the arbitration with 
arguments about the lack of jurisdiction and admissibility: it has also strongly emphasized 
that the case admission would deteriorate Sino-Philippine relations (Hong 2016: 357). In 
order to downplay the significance of the institutions, Chinese officials have argued that the 
arbitration has disturbed the current track of diplomatic dialogue and consultation to resolve 
the disputes and has only increased tensions in the region (Wang in Zhang 2017:451). 
According to them, the Tribunal has failed to resolve the disputes, disrupted the ongoing 
process of setting up the DOC-declaration and brought Sino-Philippine relations to an all-
time low69. These accusations undermine the perceived effectiveness of international 
institutions as they call for the continuation of the use of previous means to resolve the 
disputes. It therefore seems that the Chinese are trying to create an opening to resume the 
bilateral negotiations it wants to have with other claimant states, instead of resolving them 
through international arbitration institutions. 
 
7.3: Enforcement mechanisms in international institutions  
Another problem which reduces the effectiveness of the Tribunal’s decision is the difficulty of 
ensuring that the judgment is complied with. Although the decision was “binding and final”, 
China had the opportunity to hear the decision, but then to disregard it as no actor or 
institution can effectively enforce compliance (Herbert 2018:311). According to Koremos et 
al., this is because most international institutions have relatively decentralized enforcement 
arrangements which specify the possible punishments for rule violation but leave it up to the 
members to apply them (2001:772). Because many institutions like the PCA lack effective 
enforcement mechanisms to force actors into compliance, enforcement problems arose after 
the decision (Zhao 2018:1). According to Lee, China’s non-acknowledgement of the PCA’s 
jurisdiction, non-participation in the proceedings, and non-acceptance of what the court 
decided and prescribed, has made the victory of the Philippines relatively hollow (2017:179). 
                                               
68 See China, “Position Paper on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated 
by the Republic of the Philippines”, 7th December 2014. 
69 Pronunciations of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Zhang (2017:451). 
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Although several institutions like UNCLOS and involved state actors can try and coerce 
China into compliance with the decision, no actual mechanism exists which ensures Chinese 
actions to comply in practical terms. The fact that international law often lacks these 
enforcement mechanisms, gives a powerful China the opportunity to denounce international 
institutions, such as the PCA, without other countries having the ability to do something 
about it (Rapp-Hooper 2016:76) The absence of such an enforcement mechanism is 
therefore argued here to be compromising the effectiveness of the Tribunal and its decision.  
 
7.4: Compliance enforcement by international community 
As mentioned before, coercing China into compliance was dependent on international efforts 
and China’s response to this. According to Zhao, one of the problems in this case was that 
the international community lacked the will to induce significant compliance (2018:1). While 
Tribunal’s award would seemingly be a humiliating defeat for Beijing, the nature of the award 
made it easier for the Chinese to delegitimize the outcome (Zhang 2017:446). In the months 
prior to the decision, China received many requests from other countries to comply with the 
outcome of the Tribunal’s case. Due to the overwhelming, and to some, surprising outcomes 
of the decision, China was able to downplay the significance of the decision on the basis of a 
‘tribunal biased against China’ (Zhang 2017:446). Although there was a general support for 
the award within the international community, scholars argue its significance and subsequent 
international support to be downplayed because of the verdict’s sweepingness (Zhang 
2017:446). The Philippines, the U.S. and some of its key-allies issued statements calling for 
Chinese compliance with the decision. However, many other countries issuing statements 
did not mention compliance of China or even rejected the verdict, effectively reducing the 
pressure on China to recognize the decision (ibid:446). This confirms Zhao’s argument that 
the international community lacked the will to collectively pressurize China into compliance 
with the decision rendered by an international institution as the PCA, and the rules and 
regulations of UNCLOS.  
 The countries that did try to force China into compliance could only do this through 
statements, of which some had a counterproductive element. According to Zhao, China has 
effectively put U.S. statements concerning compliance to a rule-based order aside by 
pointing out the hypocrisy of the U.S. (2018:8).  The U.S. Congress has not ratified UNCLOS 
for the same reason as China did. It does not want to subject itself to the system of dispute 
settlement set out in the Convention (ibid:8). Therefore, the U.S. seems to be trying to force 
China into compliance with an institution’s rules it does not even accepts themselves. 
Without a credible condemnation of China’s rejection by the U.S., compliance with the 
judgment seems a long way off (Rosen 2017:252).  
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7.5: Bilateralism instead of compliance   
The consequence of the above arguments concerning the impairment of the effectiveness of 
the decision is that China uses a different strategy aiming to resolve the disputes outside the 
institutions. The decision of the Tribunal has had political and legal implications for China, 
especially in its future approach of managing and resolving maritime disputes (Hong 
2016:356). Taking a look at the post-arbitration diplomatic behavior of the Chinese we can 
see a clear pattern of increased bilateral negotiations and talks with separate claimant 
states. China has always advocated bilateral negotiations above institutional dispute 
settlement as the most practical means of resolving disputes between states (Hong 2018: 
221). 
A clear example is the contemporary bilateral diplomatic relationship between China 
and the Philippines. Instead of steadfastly supporting the Tribunal’s decision, and thereby 
obtaining what it has been assigned, the Philippines are going along with China’s desire to 
find a solution through bilateral consultations. As stated before, the countries reinstated 
bilateral negotiations due to the Philippines’ willingness to set the Tribunal’s decision aside in 
order to improve the economic cooperation between the countries. The two countries have 
signed multiple cooperative agreements in the economic and security realm but are also 
seeking to resolve the dispute bilaterally70. These renewed bilateral negotiations confirm the 
realist theory that international institutions do not have a direct influence on the peace and 
stability between states, but instead seems dependent on the self-interests of states and 
their subsequent behavior trying to ensure these interests being safeguarded (Mearsheimer 
1994:7). China and the Philippines surpass the decision by engaging in these bilateral 
negotiations, effectively giving China an opportunity to use its dominant position in the 
search for a solution. 
One can say that contrary to what the Tribunal’s decision would have accomplished if 
compliance with this institution had occurred, the decision did have a tension-relieving effect. 
Zhang argues that the verdict, despite not being complied with, was viewed by major actors 
involved (China, the Philippines, U.S. and ASEAN) as an opportunity to de-escalate tensions 
(2017:454). Although the Tribunal made negotiations on the disputes harder, it represented 
a turning-point in bilateral relations between China, Philippines and Vietnam because of new 
cooperation agreements instigated following the decision (ibid:454). Here again we see that 
the arbitral institution’s decision lacks direct effectiveness, while regional tensions are 
instead reduced through the individual behavior of states and their bilateral agreements with 
each other.     
                                               
70 See “China hails ‘golden period’ in relations with Philippines”, Reuters, June 29th 2017. 
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 Together, this chapter’s arguments collectively have argued that international 
institutions such as the PCA, and its decision rendered, lacks the effectiveness it is 
supposed to have on Chinese behavior. China’s a priori denouncement of the dispute 
settling mechanisms under UNCLOS; it’s efforts to delegitimize the PCA’s jurisdiction and its 
decision, supplemented by the lack of any form of effective compliance enforcement have 
contributed to an ineffectiveness of this institution and its decision. This ineffectiveness was 
therefore used as an opportunity for China to pursue bilateral negotiations instead of 
complying with the decision. This chapter has therefore argued that the ineffectiveness of 
international institutions has contributed to the opportunity for China to sustain its dominant 
position in the South China Sea, despite the Tribunal’s legally binding decision.  
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Conclusion 
 
Concluding, this research has given a three-tiered argument to explain how China was able 
to, despite the Tribunal’s decision, maintain its dominance and activity in the South China 
Sea without escalating the disputes. Firstly, this study argues that China has benefited from 
the way the Philippines and the U.S. have approached the Tribunal’s decision and the 
subsequent lack of compliance by China. A governmental change in the Philippines days 
prior to the decision has resulted in a radical turn around in foreign policy towards China, 
with president Duterte downplaying the significance of the decision by shelving the verdict in 
order to improve relations with China. Together with deteriorating U.S.-Philippine relations 
and a lack of clear U.S. strategy to challenge China’s assertive behavior, China was given 
the opportunity to remain non-compliant while continuing its activities in the disputed waters.  
 Secondly, this paper has argued that China, being an emerging global power, has 
used its growing power to exert influence and pressure on other claimant states in order to 
continue the current practice of Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. On the one hand 
it has used its means of hard power, e.g. its military power, to coerce actors into acceptance 
of the status quo of China’s dominance in the area. On the other hand, it has tried to alter 
the perception of China as a threat by becoming an attractive economic and security partner. 
These efforts result in soft power usable for China to increase support and resolve the 
disputes in its favor. The combination of hard and soft power has led to an argument of a 
Chinese ‘talk and take’ strategy in which China engages in promising talks, agreements and 
action while simultaneously taking what it claims to be hers through the use of its military 
might.  
Lastly, the final argument this study makes is that there are structural difficulties 
concerning the significance and effectiveness of the Tribunals decision. Next to difficulties 
with jurisdictional and admissibility questions, the effectiveness of the decision has been 
reduced by a lack of enforcement mechanisms in international institutions and a lack of 
collective will in the international community to enforce compliance with China. The overall 
lack of effective international institutions to resolve the disputes have led to resumption of 
bilateral negotiations as the individual behavior of states based on self-interest prevail over 
compliance with the institution’s decision. Therefore, the ineffectiveness of international 
institutions has contributed to the opportunity for China to sustain its dominant position in the 
South China Sea, despite the Tribunal’s legally binding decision 
The situation in the South China Sea is likely to preserve the status quo in the near 
future. China will continue upholding its claims, which in reality and despite some being 
illegal, still seem to outweigh the claims of other countries. Additionally, the country is simply 
much stronger from a military point of view for its neighbors to challenge. Instead of fighting, 
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regional actors now seem to be seeking cooperation as a solution to the conflict. Tensions 
have subsided, and negotiations have resumed. The Tribunal’s decision has created a new 
scope for negotiation. The Philippines will always have a stronger position in the bilateral 
negotiations with China than it did before due to having a trump card: the Tribunal’s decision 
and the eventual inescapability of the international rule-based order in which China also 
takes part. China will always have to deal with the decision, as it will never disappear and 
can always be brought forward by the Philippines or other states. Although full compliance 
by China seems out of the question, the decision should be utilized to remind China of the 
legitimate claims of other countries and its duty to adhere to international law and order. 
Being continuously reminded of this decision could moderate China's assertive behavior and 
efforts in the negotiations, possibly even making it susceptible to compromise or even 
concessions. 
As China will likely maintain it non-compliance with the decision and holds growing 
regional power and influence, negotiations between claimant states concerning the peaceful 
co-utilization of international waters and available resources will have to continue. China’s 
growing economy is increasingly hungry for the necessary raw materials, which can be 
extracted in exchange for economic deals with littoral states of the South China Sea. If 
China, in exchange for shared extraction, uses its economic clout to help and develop its 
regional neighbors with aid, investment and cooperation, all actors in the region profit from 
this win-win situation. However, it is not only in the area of raw materials that compromises 
have to be found. Shared fishing grounds, for example, are very important and already seem 
to be a feasible option, even for China. The first signs of Chinese acceptance of Philippine 
fishing vessels around disputed features such as the Scarborough Shoal have been 
reported. 
In order to maintain stability and peace in the region, peaceful negotiations will have 
to continue between China and other claimant states; either through multilateralism or 
bilateralism. The setting up of the Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China is a good 
start which at least decreases the chances of actual escalating encounters between 
maritime forces. The regional institution should expand this code with negotiations on finding 
compromises and possibilities for cooperative behavior in the South China Sea. Solving the 
disputes will not have to be a matter of who owns which island, but of how to work together 
on the development and security of the South Chinese Sea basin. Joint monitoring of one of 
the world’s most important trade routes should be carried out by regional actors, while 
ensuring freedom of navigation for every country. The U.S., still being a highly influential 
actor in the region, will of course be involved in regional cooperation but has to start 
recognizing and respecting China’s role and growing importance in the region. Instead of 
containment, co-existence should be the aim for these regional super powers. 
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Future developments in the non-compliant position of China, the formation of 
effective enforcement mechanisms in international institutions and in the political landscape 
of the international community might change the situation dramatically. Continuous research 
into these developments can therefore add value to the explanation of the course of the 
South China Sea disputes in the future. 
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